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Abstract
We study the ex-ante maximization of market efficiency, defined in terms of minimum devia-
tion of market prices from fundamental values, from a centralized planner’s perspective. Prices
are pressured from exogenous trading actions of leverage targeting banks, which rebalance their
portfolios in response to asset shocks. We develop an explicit expression for the matrix of asset
holdings which minimizes market inefficiency, and characterize it in terms of two key sufficient
statistics: the banks’ systemic significance and the statistical moments of asset shocks. Our
analysis shows that higher homogeneity in banks’ systemic significance requires banks’ portfolio
holdings to be further away from a full diversification strategy to reduce inefficiencies.
Keywords: Systemic economy; systemic significance; price pressure; leverage targeting; market
efficiency.
1 Introduction
Forced asset sales and purchases have been widely observed in financial markets. The most popular
form of forced trading is that of fire sales, and has been extensively implemented by hedge funds and
broker dealers during the global 2007-2009 financial crisis; see Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008)
and Khandani and Lo (2011) for empirical evidence.
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An asset is sold at a depressed price by a seller who faces financial constraints that become
binding, i.e., when the seller becomes unable to pay his own creditors without liquidating the asset.
For example, members of a clearinghouse need to post additional collateral if the value of their
portfolios drops by a significant amount (Pirrong (2011)). Similarly, a mutual fund may need to
liquidate assets at discounted prices if it faces heavy redemption requests from its investors, and
does not have enough cash reserves at disposal (Chen et al. (2010)). Banks manage their leverage
based on internal value at risk models (Adrian and Shin (2014); Greenlaw et al. (2008)), and may
need to liquidate (or purchase) assets if negative (or positive) shocks hit their balance sheets.
Forced purchases, despite less emphasized, are also important in financial markets. For instance,
empirical evidence (see Coval and Stafford (2007)) suggests that equity mutual funds substantially
increase their existing positions if they experience large inflows, thus creating upward pressure in
the price of stocks held by these funds. Such inflow-driven purchases produce trading opportunities
for outsiders, who would be able to sell their assets and earn a significant premium.
Asset purchases and sales triggered by financial constraints push asset prices away from fun-
damental values (Shleifer and Vishny (1992)), a form of inefficiency that we analyze in a systemic
economy. Typically, when a firm must sell assets to fulfill a financial constraint, the potential
buyers with the highest valuation for the asset are other firms belonging to the same industry or
investors with appropriate expertise. Those firms are likely to be in a similar financial situation,
and thus unable to supply liquidity. The buyers of these assets are then outsiders, who value these
assets less. A symmetric argument holds if the firm executes inflow-driven purchases.
When a firm impacts asset prices through its trading actions, other market participants who
happen to hold the same assets on their balance sheets are also affected, and may in turn violate
their financial constraints, making it necessary for them to take trading actions. Through this
process, the trading risk becomes systemic, i.e, it imposes cascading effects on asset prices and
recursively impacts the equity of market participants through common asset ownership.
We consider an economy consisting of leveraged institutions (henceforth, called banks) that
track a fixed leverage ratio. Empirically, this behavior has been well documented for commercial
banks in the United States, see, e.g., Adrian and Shin (2010). After a shock hits an asset class,
prices change and so does the bank’s leverage ratio. To fulfill the financial constraint of targeting its
leverage, the bank must then liquidate or purchase assets, depending on whether the experienced
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shock was positive or negative. Banks trade assets with other non-banking institutions that we
model collectively as a representative nonbanking sector, assumed to have a downward sloping
demand function as in Capponi and Larsson (2015). The equilibrium price of the asset is uniquely
pinned down by the point at which the demand of the banking and nonbanking sector intersect.
We study market efficiency, measured by the mean squared deviation of fundamental capitaliza-
tion, where all banks’ portfolios are valued at the fundamental values, from market capitalization
where banks’ portfolios are valued at the market prices. The latter prices internalize the pressure
imposed by trading activities, as banks leverage or deleverage in response to exogenous shocks to
asset values. Clearly, the closer prices are to their fundamental values, the more efficient the market
is.
We consider the problem of maximizing efficiency from a centralized planner’s perspective. This
objective can be micro-founded in terms of increasing the information content of prices, and as a
result, better guiding the resource allocation in the economy. Brunnermeier et al. (2018) provide
a simple economic setting, in which maximizing social welfare is consistent with the objectives of
minimizing the deviation of asset prices from fundamentals, and of reducing asset market volatility.1
We develop an explicit characterization of the distribution of banks’ holdings that ex-ante
maximize market efficiency. We refer to those as the f-efficient holdings2. The key insight resulting
from our approach is the identification of a sufficient statistic, the systemic significance vector,
which captures the contribution of each bank to increased price pressures.
The systemic significance depends on the banks’ target leverage, the banks’ trading strategies,
and the illiquidity characteristics of the assets. We adopt an “aggregate first then allocate” pro-
cedure to construct a solution to the quadratic minimization problem yielding f-efficient holdings.
First, using the statistics of asset shocks we construct a vector of auxiliary weighted holdings. Then,
we distribute the holdings to the banks based on their contributions to market inefficiency, which
is directly proportional to their systemic significance.
We show that portfolio diversification is f-efficient if asset price shocks are homogeneous and
banks are heterogeneous in terms of their systemic significance. Our analysis suggests that as the
1The important role of prices in aggregating information that is dispersed in the economy has also been con-
sidered in the early work of Hayek (1945). Prices thereby facilitate the efficient allocation of scarce resources.
In the context of secondary markets, this issue is, e.g., discussed in Leland (1992), Dow and Gorton (1997),
Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001), Dow and Rahi (2003), and Goldstein and Guembel (2008).
2The terminology f-efficient is used to emphasize that the notion of efficiency we consider is related to fundamentals.
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shocks hitting an asset class become (statistically) larger, it is beneficial to transfer the holdings
of such an asset from a more systemically significant to a less systemically significant bank to
raise efficiency. We demonstrate that the more homogeneous the economy is in terms of banks’
systemic significance, the further away the matrix of f-efficient holdings is from the matrix of full
asset diversification.
Literature Review There is, by now, a large number of studies that have analyzed the systemic
implications of leverage and risk taking in an economy of leveraged institutions. Existing literature
has identified two main channels through which banks are interlinked. The first channel is through
the liability side of the balance sheet. Banks have claims on their debtors, and once they are
hit by shocks, they may become unable to honor their liabilities, potentially triggering negative
feedback loops from reduced payments through the system. Seminal contributions in this direction
include Eisenberg and Noe (2001), which provides an algorithm to measure contagion triggered
by sequential defaults in the network of obligations, and Acemoglu et al. (2015), who analyze the
stability of various network structures and their resilience to shocks of different sizes.3
The second channel is through the asset side of the balance sheet, as banks are interlinked
through common portfolio holdings. Financial contagion arises when banks take hits on their
balance sheets, typically because the price of their assets is subject to pressure due to forced
purchases or sales (see also the discussion in the introduction). Our paper contributes to this
stream of literature. Our study is related to the study of Greenwood et al. (2015), who calibrate
a model of fire-sale spillovers, assuming an economy of leverage targeting banks. Their work has
been extended by Capponi and Larsson (2015), who consider the higher order effects of fire-sales
externalities in a similar leverage targeting model. Duarte and Eisenbach (2019) construct and
empirically valuate a measure of systemic risk generated by fire-sales externalities. The main
components of their measure, namely banks’ sizes, leverages, and illiquidity concentration, also
constitute the primary determinants of the systemic significance vector in our model. Other works
have considered models where contagion happens both through the asset and liability side of the
3Other related works include Elliott et al. (2014) and Gai and Kapadia (2010). Glasserman and Young
(2015), Capponi et al. (2016), and Rogers and Veraart (2013) account for the impact of bankruptcy costs
at defaults in a counterparty network model of financial contagion. Measures of systemic downside risk
are analyzed in the works by Chen, Iyengar, and Moallemi (2013), Feinstein, Rudloff, and Weber (2017), and
Biagini, Fouque, Frittelli, and Meyer-Brandis (2019).
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balance sheet; see, for instance, the earlier work of Cifuentes et al. (2005), and the more recent
works of Amini et al. (2013), Chen et al. (2016), and Weber and Weske (2017). The models used
in these papers build on the clearing payment framework of Eisenberg and Noe (2001), and further
assume that banks sell illiquid assets when their available cash holdings plus payments received
from other banks in the network are insufficient.
The analytical infrastructure of our model builds on the work of Greenwood et al. (2015) and
Capponi and Larsson (2015). As in Greenwood et al. (2015), we restrict attention to the first-
order effects of price pressures, i.e., those caused by the first round of banks’ trading actions in
response to shocks. As in Capponi and Larsson (2015), price impact is endogenous in our model
and is determined by the capacity of the unconstrained nonbanking sector to absorb the trading
pressure of the constrained banks. While Greenwood et al. (2015), Duarte and Eisenbach (2019),
and Capponi and Larsson (2015) consider an ex-post model of asset contagion, where banks manage
their assets after the shock has occurred, the present paper conducts an ex-ante analysis of balance
sheet holdings.
A related study by Cont and Schaaning (2017) develops a systemic stress testing model, and
compares the asset pricing implications of threshold based versus target leveraging. Wagner (2011)
analyzes the tradeoff between diversity on the systemic level and diversification at the banking
level. While we focus on the centralized problem of maximizing market efficiency, Wagner (2011)
considers the privately optimal solution. Specifically, he analyzes the Nash equilibrium of portfolio
holdings in an economy consisting of a continuum of infinitesimally small investors with limited
liability, each of them suffering liquidation costs only if he is not the only one to liquidate assets.4
Finally, our work is related to a branch of literature that has analyzed the stability of port-
folio allocations, diversification, and heavy tail risks of portfolios. Using a generalized branching
process approach, Caccioli, Shrestha, Moore, and Farmer (2014) identify a critical threshold for
leverage which separates stable from unstable portfolio allocations (see also Raffestin (2014)). In
a risk-sharing context, Ibragimov et al. (2011) analyze the tradeoff of diversity and diversification
for heavy-tailed risk portfolio distributions. They show that the incentives of intermediaries (for
diversification) and society (for diversity) are not necessarily aligned. Their findings are confirmed
4Portfolio similarity has also been considered in other industry sectors than banking. In the insurance industry,
Girardi et al. (2019) find a strong positive relationship between the portfolio similarity of pair of insurance companies,
and their quarterly common sales during the following year.
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by results of Beale, Rand, Battey, Croxson, May, and Nowak (2011), who analyze the individually
and systemically optimal allocations in a simplified loss model consisting of a small number of
banks and assets.
Outline The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the asset price contagion model.
Our main contributions start from Section 3, where we define the quantitative measure of market
efficiency, and identify key drivers of this measure such as the vector of banks’ systemic significance.
In Section 4, we characterize f-efficient allocations. Section 5 provides case studies for a calibrated
version of our model, which highlight the trade-off between diversification and diversity. Section 6
concludes. All proofs are delegated to Appendix A.
2 Model Specification
To begin with, we introduce a few notations and definitions used throughout the paper. For two
(column) vectors u = (u1, . . . , un)
⊤ and v = (v1, . . . , vn)
⊤, we let u ◦ v = (u1v1, . . . , unvn)
⊤ denote
the componentwise product. Similarly, uv = (u1/v1, . . . , un/vn)
⊤ denotes the componentwise ratio.
We use Diag(u) to denote the diagonal matrix with vector u on the diagonal. The identity matrix
is denoted by I, the vector or matrix of ones is denoted by 1, and the vector or matrix of zeros is
denoted by 0, where the dimension is either specified explicitly, e.g., 1K ∈ R
K , or clear from the
context.
Our analysis is developed within the one-period version of the price contagion model by Capponi and Larsson
(2015), which we briefly review in this section. They consider a financial market that consists of two
sectors: a banking sector and a nonbanking sector. Each bank manages its asset portfolio to track
a fixed leverage ratio, consistently with empirical evidence reported in the seminal contribution of
Adrian and Shin (2010).5 The nonbanking sector consists of institutions that are primarily equity
funded (e.g., mutual funds, money market funds, insurances, and pension funds) and thus do not
engage in leverage targeting.
There are K types of assets available, whose market prices at time t = 0, 1 are denoted by P kt .
5In practice, banks do not immediately revert to the target leverage. Duarte and Eisenbach (2019) estimate the
speed of leverage adjustment, and find that leverage adjustment speed is roughly constant until 2006, before increasing
by over 50% and spiking in 2008 due to the greater delevering through balance sheet contraction. Because we consider
a one period snapshot of the economy, we may simply view the target leverage as a short-term target leverage.
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We write
Pt = (P
1
t , P
2
t , . . . , P
K
t )
⊤
for the column vector of asset prices. The aggregate supply of each asset is fixed and given by
Qtot = (Q
1
tot, . . . , Q
K
tot)
⊤. Each asset k is hit by an exogenous shock Zk, which is modeled as
a random variable. We use Z = (Z1, . . . , ZK)⊤ to denote the vector of shocks. The vector of
fundamental values of the assets at time 1 is P0 + Z, while we use P1 to denote the vector of
equilibrium prices which internalize banks’ responses to shocks.
2.1 The Banking Sector
The economy consists of N banks, whose stylized balance sheets consist of assets, debt, and equity.
Banks manage their balance sheets by buying or selling assets so to keep their leverage ratios
(debt to equity ratios) at specified target levels. Banks hold a portfolio of assets at time 0. Then,
price shocks occur, and banks purchase or sell assets to restore leverage. These actions impose
pressure on prices, and as a result, the market value of bank portfolios at time 1 deviates from its
fundamental value.
The quantity (number of units) of asset k held by bank i at time t is denoted by Qkit . We
use Qit = (Q
1i
t , Q
2i
t , . . . , Q
Ki
t )
⊤ ∈ RK to denote the vector of bank i’s holdings at t, and Q :=
(Qki0 )k=1,...,K,i=1,...,N ∈ R
K×N to denote the matrix of banks’ holdings at time zero. We write
Ait = (A
1i
t , A
2i
t , . . . , A
Ki
t )
⊤, where Akit = P
k
t Q
ki
t is the market value of the i’th bank’s holdings in
asset k at t. The total market value of the i’th bank is given by 1⊤Ait =
∑K
k=1A
ki
t .
Banks finance purchases by issuing debt. We use Dit to denote the total amount of debt issued
by bank i at time t, and assume that the interest rate on the debt is zero.6 The main behavioral
assumption in the model is that each bank i targets a fixed leverage ratio (debt to equity ratio) κi,
i.e.,
Dit
1⊤Ait −D
i
t
= κi, t = 0, 1, i = 1, . . . , N. (2.1)
Each bank executes an exogenously specified strategy αi ∈ RK , which specifies how a change
in the amount of debt is offset by purchases or sales of the different assets in the portfolio. Hence,
6Accounting for an exogenous nonzero interest rate would not qualitatively affect the results. Because our focus
is on the price inefficiencies caused by banks’ trading responses to shock, we opt for a simpler model that highlights
these effects.
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it holds that
∑K
k=1 α
ki = 1. For future purposes, let α := (αki)k=1,...,K,i=1,...,N ∈ R
K×N denote the
trading strategy matrix, and let Li = κi/(1 + κi). Hence, by the leverage equation (2.1), it always
holds that Dit = L
i1⊤Ait for t = 0, 1.
The banks’ demand curves, where ∆Qki := Qki1 − Q
ki
0 denotes the change in quantities from
period 0 to period 1, admit an explicit expression.
Proposition 2.1 (Capponi and Larsson (2015)). The incremental demand of bank i for asset k is
given by
∆Qki = αkiκiQi⊤0
∆P
P k1
. (2.2)
2.2 The Nonbanking Sector
Nonbanking institutions trade the same assets as the banking sector. This gives rise to additional
demand, which we refer to as the nonbanking demand and model it in a reduced form. We assume
that demand curves are decoupled across assets, i.e., the nonbanking demand for asset k only
depends on the price of asset k, and not on the prices of other assets.7
At time 0, the nonbanking sector holds a quantity Qk,nb0 of asset k, and we write A
k,nb
0 =
P k0Q
k,nb
0 for the corresponding asset value. Unlike the banking sector whose demand function is
upward sloping, the nonbanking sector has a downward sloping demand curve: it sells an asset if
its price is above the fundamental value, and purchases an asset if its price is below its fundamental
value. Hence, the nonbanking sector acts as the liquidity provider when there are shocks, and
exerts a stabilizing force on the pressure imposed by banks. The demand for asset k is given by
∆Qk,nb = − γkQ
k,nb
0
∆P k − Zk
P k1
, (2.3)
where γk is a positive constant. This choice of demand function admits the following interpretation.
Assume no shock occurs, i.e. Zk = 0. Then
∆Qk,nb
Qk,nb0
= −γk
∆P k
P k1
. (2.4)
The parameter γk can thus be interpreted as the elasticity of the nonbanking demand for asset k,
7This modeling choice allows us to focus only on the price impact caused by the banks’ needs of tracking their
leverage requirements.
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similar to κiαki in (2.2) for the banking sector. We refer to γk as the illiquidity characteristic of
asset k. Unlike equation (2.4), (2.3) includes the correction term Zk, because nonbanking demand
is due to deviations from fundamental values. We write Qnbt = (Q
1, nb
t , . . . , Q
K,nb
t )
⊤, and denote by
γ = (γ1, . . . , γK)
⊤ the vector of illiquidity characteristics.
2.3 Asset Prices
In this section, we review the mechanism used to determine prices. The market-clearing condition
is given by
Qnbt +
N∑
i=1
Qit = Qtot, t = 0, 1, (2.5)
where the vector Qtot of aggregate supply is constant through time. Capponi and Larsson (2015)
identify the systemicness matrix S defined by S =
∑N
i=1
αi
γ◦Qnb
0
κiQi⊤0 ∈ R
K×K, or, in component-
wise form,
Skℓ =
N∑
i=1
αki
κiQℓi0
γkQ
k,nb
0
, k, ℓ = 1, . . . ,K, (2.6)
as the primary determinant of market prices. This matrix captures how a shock to asset ℓ propagates
to asset k through the banks’ deleveraging activities.
Proposition 2.2 (Proposition 2.1. in Capponi and Larsson (2015)). The dynamics of asset prices
are given by
∆P = (I − S)−1 Z, (2.7)
assuming that the matrix inverse exists.
Assumption 1. We will assume that the spectral radius of S is smaller than one. This yields
invertibility of the matrix I − S, as needed in Proposition 2.2, with (I − S)−1 =
∑∞
j=0S
j. The
spectral radius ρ(S) for non-negative S is bounded from above by (cf. Capponi and Larsson (2015)
and Horn and Johnson (1985), Corollary 8.1.29):
ρ(S) ≤ max
k=1,...,K
∑N
i=1 κ
iαki
∑K
ℓ=1Q
ℓi
0
γkQk,nb
.
The spectral radius is small if the size of the nonbanking sector is large in comparison to the size
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of the leverage targeting banking sector, leverage targets are not too large and price elasticities are
not too small.
3 Market Inefficiencies and Systemic Significance
In this section, we introduce the measure used to quantify price deviation from fundamentals, and
characterize the key quantities that determine market efficiency. Section 3.1 derives an explicit
expression for the price deviation from fundamentals, and states the objective function of minimiz-
ing market efficiency in a systemic economy. Section 3.2 introduces a key sufficient statistic, the
bank’s systemic significance, that quantifies the contribution to price pressures of each bank in the
economy.
3.1 Market Capitalization and Deviation from Efficiency
Banks actively manage their balance sheets in response to shocks, and this imposes a pressure on
asset prices, pushing them away from fundamental values. The value of market capitalization at
the end of period 1 is given by
MCe := Q⊤totP1 = Q
⊤
tot(P0 +∆P )
= Q⊤tot
(
P0 + (I − S)
−1 Z
)
, (3.1)
where we recall that Z is the vector of exogenous price shocks (cf. equation (2.7)). In the absence
of leverage-tracking banks, changes in prices are driven solely by changes in fundamentals, i.e., by
the exogenous shocks. The resulting market capitalization is denoted by MCf , and given by
MCf := Q⊤tot(P0 + Z).
The contribution to realized asset prices arising from the presence of leverage targeting banks,
denoted by D :=MCe −MCf , is a measure of market inefficiency.
Under the conditions discussed in Assumption 1, we obtain the first order approximation to
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market capitalization given by
MCa := Q⊤tot (P0 + (I + S)Z) ,
where we consider only the first term in the power series expansion of (I − S)−1.
Recall that the i’th column of the matrix Q denotes the initial asset holdings of bank i. We then
obtain the following first order approximation for the fire-sales externalities:
D ≈MCa −MCf = Q⊤tot(SZ) = (Qv)
⊤Z, (3.2)
where
v := Diag(κ)α⊤
Qtot
γ ◦Qnb0
∈ RN . (3.3)
We refer to the vector v as the systemic significance of the N banks, and discuss its properties and
economic implications in Section 3.2. The vector Qv, i.e., the initial allocation of assets within the
banking sector weighted by their systemic significance, is a network multiplier: it describes how an
initial price shock Z is amplified through the network of balance sheet holdings due to the leverage
targeting actions of the banks.
Deviation from Efficiency: We use the mean squared deviation criterion
E[D2] ≈ E[(MCa −MCf )2] =:MSD(Q),
to quantify ex-ante these inefficiencies. We use the average of the squares of price deviation from
fundamentals, i.e., we penalize equally positive and negative deviations of market prices from fun-
damental values.
We use µ and Σ to denote, respectively, the expected value and covariance matrix of shocks,
i.e., E[Z] = µ = (µ1, . . . , µK)
⊤, and Cov[Z] = Σ ∈ RK×K. Henceforth, we impose the following
assumption on the distribution of asset shocks.
Assumption 2. Price shocks Zk, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, are uncorrelated with variances σ
2 = (σ21 , . . . , σ
2
K)
⊤,
i.e., Σ = Diag(σ2), σk > 0, and the initial asset prices are normalized to P
k
0 = 1, k = 1, . . . ,K.
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Assumption 2 allows us to focus solely on the endogenous correlation, i.e., linkages between
prices arising from the leverage targeting actions of the banks due to overlapping portfolios.
3.2 Systemic Significance
This section discusses the properties of the systemic significance of a bank, and its dependence on
the model primitives. We start observing that, for any bank i, its systemic significance equals
vi = κi
K∑
k=1
αki
γk
·
Qktot
Qk,nb0
,
as it easily follows from Eq. (3.3). The systemic significance vi depends on the targeted leverage
κi, banks’ strategies αki, the vector γ of price elasticities, and the initial proportion of assets held
by the nonbanking sector
Qk,nb
0
Qktot
. If bank i liquidates a large fraction of an illiquid asset (i.e., α
ki
γk
is
high), then it creates a larger price pressure, especially if it is targeting a high leverage κi. If the
nonbanking sector holds a significant fraction of the assets in the economy, then it will be able to
better absorb the aggregate demand of the banking sector, and thus the systemic significance of
any bank in the system will be reduced.
Remark 3.1. Observe that both D and the square-root of the mean squared deviation
√
E[D2] =√
E[(MCa −MCf )2] are positively homogeneous, when viewed as functions of the systemic sig-
nificance vector v. In particular, price pressures vanish and the market becomes efficient when v
approaches zero; conversely, as v gets large, inefficiencies are higher.
The mean and variance of market capitalization can be uniquely characterized by the matrix of
asset holdings and the systemic significance of the banks in the system, as stated next.
Lemma 3.1. It holds that
E[D] = (Qv)⊤µ, Var[D] = (Qv)⊤Σ (Qv).
Moreover, the mean squared deviation of price pressures equal
MSD(Q) := E[D2] = Var[D] + E[D]2
12
= (Qv)⊤ (µµ⊤ +Diag(σ2))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:G∈RK×K
(Qv). (3.4)
The formulas above indicate that the mean squared deviation is a function of Qv, i.e., the
initial allocation of assets within the banking sector weighted by their systemic significance, and of
statistics about fundamental shocks collected in the matrix G. This is consistent with intuition:
larger shocks require banks to trade a higher amount of assets to restore their leverage targets. As
a result, through the network multiplier Qv, these shocks are amplified more and lead to a higher
pressure on prices.
4 f-Efficient Holdings
In this section, we study the impact of banks’ portfolio holdings on market efficiency, and develop
an explicit construction of holding matrices which minimize the deviation of market capitalization
from its fundamental value. We refer to those matrices as f-efficient holdings. Section 4.1 introduces
a two-step procedure, “aggregate first then allocate” to construct f-efficient holdings. Section 4.2
discusses the relation between f-efficient holdings and the diversification benchmark where each
bank fully diversifies its portfolio holdings.
4.1 Characterization of f-Efficient Holdings
Taking the initial budget of the banks as fixed, we compute the matrix Q of initial holdings which
is f-efficient, i.e., which minimizes the mean squared deviation MSD(Q).8
Let q ∈ RK be the vector of total initial holdings of the banking sector, and b ∈ RN the vector
of banks’ initial budgets. The set of initially feasible asset allocations within the banking sector is
then given by
D = D(q, b) := {Q ∈ RK×N | Q1N = q and 1
⊤
KQ = b
⊤},
where we have assumed that the initial prices of all assets are normalized (see Assumption 2). We
8In Appendix C, we study the sensitivity of market inefficiencies to the matrix α of banks’ trading strategies,
taking the initial holdings as given. Consistent with intuition, we find that it is f-efficient for banks to sell solely the
most liquid asset.
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then obtain
K∑
k=1
qk =
N∑
i=1
bi =: T.
Example 1. Full portfolio diversification corresponds to the holding matrix
Qdiversified :=
1
T
qb⊤ =

b1q1
T · · ·
bN q1
T
...
. . .
...
b1qK
T · · ·
bN qK
T
 ∈ D . (4.1)
In the special case that initial holdings are the same for all assets, i.e., q1 = q2 = . . . = qK , then
full diversification is characterized by the holding matrix
Qdiversified =

b1
K · · ·
bN
K
...
. . .
...
b1
K · · ·
bN
K
 .
Definition 1. A feasible allocation matrix Q∗ ∈ D such that
Q∗ ∈ argmin
Q∈D
(Qv)⊤G(Qv)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=MSD(Q)
(4.2)
is called f-efficient.
f-efficient holdings are those which minimize, ex-ante, the mean squared deviation of asset prices
from fundamentals among all feasible allocations. To exclude trivial cases and make the problem
interesting, we make the following assumption, which is typically satisfied in practice.
Assumption 3. There exist some i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that vi 6= vj , and it holds that b
⊤v 6= 0.
Remark 4.1. If v1 = . . . = vN then, for each given asset, it does not matter how it is distributed
across the banks because all have the same systemic significance. As a result, MSD(Q) is constant
for all Q ∈ D , taking into account the constraint Q1 = q. The requirement that systemic signif-
icance is not identical across banks is satisfied by any economy, which is not fully homogeneous
in terms of targeted leverage and trading strategy. Empirically, Duarte and Eisenbach (2019), see
Table 4 therein, finds substantial variation in banks’ leverage targets, with a size-weighted average
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of 13.6, an equal-weighted average of 11.5, and a standard deviation of 3.9.9 If b⊤v = 0, then there
must exist banks in the system which are short some of the assets. Then, the negative price pressure
imposed by some banks in the system would be compensated by a positive price pressure created by
other banks. In this case, diversification would be f-efficient, and lead to zero deviation of asset
prices from fundamental values, i.e., MSD(Qdiversified) = ( 1T qb
⊤v)⊤G( 1T qb
⊤v) = 0. In practice,
however, b⊤v > 0 because the budget and the systemic significance of any bank in the system are
both positive. Banks are long their assets, including consumer loans, agency, non-agency securities,
municipal securities, etc., see, again, Table 4 in Duarte and Eisenbach (2019).
We next describe the two-step procedure used to construct f-efficient holding matrices:
• Step 1: Aggregation. In this step, we recover the network multiplier y that minimizes the
mean squared deviation, and which is consistent with the market structure. Concretely, let
Dy := {y ∈ R
K | 1⊤Ky = b
⊤v}. Such a multiplier is obtained from banks’ initial holdings (and
budgets), upon weighting them with the systemic significance vector, i.e.,
y∗ ∈ argmin
y∈Dy
y⊤Gy. (4.3)
Because of this weighting, this multiplier accounts for the banks’ leverage tracking behav-
ior, their liquidation strategies, and illiquidity characteristics of the assets. We refer to the
minimizing vector y∗ as the aggregate v-weighted holdings.
• Step 2: Allocation. In this step, we identify an allocation of asset holdings to banks, which
is consistent with the vector of aggregate v-weighted holdings obtained from the previous
step. Specifically, we denote by Q∗ ∈ D the matrix, consistent with the budget and supply
constraints, which distributes the aggregate v-weighted holdings to individual banks according
to their systemic significance, i.e., Q∗v = y∗.
The decomposition discussed above presents both conceptual and computational advantages. From
a conceptual perspective, observe that the matrix G of shock statistics and the vector v of banks’
9Their sample includes the largest 100 banks by assets every quarter, in a sample period from the third quarter of
1999 to the third quarter of 2016 at the quarterly frequency. They also find that 5% and 95% of the leverage target
distribution are, respectively, 6.8 and 16.9, and that there is more cross-sectional than time-series variation.
15
systemic significance are “sufficient statistics” for the problem. In the aggregation step, the min-
imized functional only depends on G, while v only enters into the constraint set. The allocation
step instead, takes the aggregate holdings computed from the previous step as given, and deter-
mines the holding matrix only on the basis of v. From a computational point of view, observe that
finding the f-efficient holdings requires solving a K ×N dimensional quadratic problem with linear
constraints. Using the proposed decomposition, we first solve a K dimensional quadratic problem
with one linear constraint, and subsequently solve a simple K×N dimensional unconstrained linear
system.
The following proposition states that the two-step procedure described above identifies f-efficient
holdings.
Proposition 4.1. Let N ≥ 2,K ≥ 1. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) Q∗ ∈ D is f-efficient.
(ii) y∗ = Q∗v for some Q∗ ∈ D , and y∗ solves the problem (4.3).
In the rest of the section, we discuss in more detail each step of the procedure above, and
highlight the key economic insights.
4.1.1 Step 1: Aggregation
We start showing that the minimization problem (4.3) admits a unique solution.
Lemma 4.1. The unique solution to problem (4.3) is given by
y∗ :=
b⊤v
1⊤Kz
· z,
where z := G−11K ∈ R
K .
The above expression indicates that aggregate v-weighted holdings are determined by the vec-
tor v, capturing the systemic significance of banks, weighted by the budget each bank is endowed
with, and by the inverse of the matrix G which captures the size of the exogenous price shocks.
Specifically, the aggregate systemically weighted budget vector b⊤v is split into the K available
assets through the inverse of G.
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Example 2. Consider the special case of zero mean shocks, i.e., set µ = 0. Then y∗k = (b
⊤v) ·
1/σ2
k∑K
ℓ=1 1/σ
2
ℓ
. Hence, the higher the variance of price shocks σ2k, the lower the fraction of asset k in
the aggregate v-weighted holdings portfolio y∗. This is intuitive: an asset that creates high price
pressure when banks manage their assets to restore their target leverage should, in aggregate, be
invested less.
4.1.2 Step 2: Allocation
In the second step, the aggregate v-weighted holdings y∗ ∈ RK are allocated to the individual
banks.
Proposition 4.2. For every N ≥ 2,K ≥ 1, there exists a matrix Q∗ ∈ D satisfying Q∗v = y∗.
In the proof of the proposition, we construct a particular solutionQ∗, and describe the structure
of the linear subspace of solutions. The following theorem quantifies the mean squared deviation
achieved by a matrix of f-efficient holdings, and addresses the uniqueness of the allocation.
Theorem 4.2. Let N,K ≥ 2.
a) There exists an f-efficient holding matrix Q∗ with mean squared deviation
MSD(Q∗) =
(b⊤v)2
1⊤KG
−11K
. (4.4)
b) The f-efficient holding matrix is unique, if and only if there are exactly N = 2 banks. In this
case, the unique f-efficient holding matrix is given by
QN=2 :=
1
v2 − v1
(
v2q − y
∗ y∗ − v1q
)
∈ RK×2. (4.5)
4.2 When is Diversification f-Efficient?
In this subsection, we provide the conditions under which full diversification is f-efficient.
Theorem 4.3. Full diversification Qdiversified is f-efficient, if and only if q and z = G−11K are
linearly dependent.
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A direct consequence of the above theorem is that full diversification is f-efficient if the system
is completely homogeneous, i.e., all asset shocks have the same mean and variance, and the total
initial holdings of the banks are the same. Full diversification is no longer f-efficient if a little
amount of heterogeneity is introduced in the system.
Corollary 4.1. If either
a) q1 = . . . = qK , σ
2
1 = . . . = σ
2
K , µ1 = . . . = µK−1 and µK = µ1 + ε with ε 6= −Kµ1, or
b) µ1 = . . . = µK , σ
2
1 = . . . = σ
2
K , q1 = . . . = qK−1 and qK = q1 + ε, or
c) q1 = . . . = qK , µ1 = . . . = µK , σ
2
1 = . . . = σ
2
K−1 and σ
2
K = σ
2
1 + ε,
then Qdiversified is f-efficient, if and only if ε = 0.
The result in the above corollary is consistent with intuition. If assets are fully homogeneous
and the total holdings of the banking sector in each asset are the same, there is no reason to prefer
one asset over the other. In this case, full diversification minimizes the portfolio liquidation risk
and is optimal. However, as soon as assets no longer have identical characteristics, an f-efficient
allocation requires to allocate assets to banks in accordance with their systemic significance.
5 Comparative Statics and Examples
In this section, we construct case studies to analyze the structure of f-efficient holdings. In the first
part of this section, we consider the stylized case N = K = 2, and study the distance of f-efficient
holdings from diversification as a function of key model parameters. For any matrix Q ∈ RK×N ,
we measure the distance from full diversification by the Frobenius norm
d(Q) := ‖Q−Qdiversified‖F .
In the second part of the section, we study the minimal distance of f-efficient holdings from full
diversification for the case N = K = 3. In the third part, we compare the impact of f-efficiency
and diversification on the distribution of market capitalization under different economic scenarios.
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5.1 The Case N = K = 2
According to Theorem 4.2 b), the f-efficient holding matrix for N = K = 2 is unique and given by
Q2×2 :=
1
v2 − v1
v2q1 − y∗1 y∗1 − v1q1
v2q2 − y
∗
2 y
∗
2 − v1q2
 . (5.1)
We normalize the total supply of assets within the banking sector, and the budgets of banks to
q1 = q2 = b1 = b2 =: x > 0; following Capponi and Larsson (2015), we choose x = 0.08, where the
total supply is normalized to 1 for each asset. Hence, the the total size of the banking sector is 8%
of the total size of the system.
5.1.1 Systemic Significance and Asset Riskiness
We start with an exploratory analysis, where we plot the f-efficient holdings of bank 1 and the
distance of f-efficient holdings from diversification d(Q2×2) as a function of the riskiness of the first
asset. Consistent with Corollary 4.1, full diversification is f-efficient if and only if σ21 = σ
2
2 = 0.2
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Figure 1: f-efficient holdings of bank 1 Q2×2k,1 for assets k = 1, 2 and distance from diversification,
d(Q2×2) = ‖Q2×2−Qdiversified‖F , as a function of σ
2
1 . We fix σ
2
2 = 0.2, µ = (0, 0)
⊤, v = (0.04, 0.07)⊤ ,
q = b = (0.08, 0.08)⊤ .
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(cf. Corollary 4.1). Figure 1 additionally suggests that a systemically more significant bank would
have lower f-efficient holdings in the riskier asset than a systemically less significant bank: as σ1
increases, bank 2 decreases its holdings in asset 1, while bank 1 increases it holdings in that asset.
We rigorously formalize these observations in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.1. Let q1 = q2 = b1 = b2 = x > 0 and µ1 = µ2.
a) For σ1 > 0, we have
∂
∂σ1
d(Q2×2)

< 0, if σ21 < σ
2
2,
> 0, if σ21 > σ
2
2.
b) If v2 > v1 > 0, then
∂Q2×2
11
∂σ1
> 0 for σ1 > 0.
5.1.2 Systemic Significance and Shock Sizes
As in the previous subsection, we start with a graphical illustration of the sensitivity of bank 1’s
f-efficient holdings and their distance from diversification to changes in the expected shock size µ.
Figure 2 indicates that, as the expected (absolute) size of price shocks for asset 2 increases, the
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
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Figure 2: F-efficient holdings of bank 1 Q2×2k,1 for assets k = 1, 2 and distance from diversification
d(Q2×2) = ‖Q2×2 − Qdiversified‖F as a function of µ2 for fixed σ
2 = (0.1, 0.2)⊤ , µ1 = 0, v =
(0.04, 0.07)⊤ , q = b = (0.08, 0.08)⊤ .
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f-efficient holdings of the least systemically significant bank (i.e., bank 1) increase. This can be,
again, understood in terms of the banks’ systemic significances: a more systemically significant
bank, i.e., one that tracks a higher leverage ratio or which trades a larger fraction of illiquid assets,
should reduce its holdings of asset 2, because the trading actions in response to the shock impose
a higher pressure on the price, and hence large deviation of prices from fundamentals.
The distance from a full diversification strategy is minimal when the system achieves the highest
possible degree of homogeneity, i.e., µ2 = µ1. As the system becomes more heterogeneous, the
distance increases. As shown in Corollary 4.1, the minimal distance converges to zero as the
system becomes fully homogeneous, i.e., σ1 = σ2. We formalize these observations via the following
lemma.
Lemma 5.2. Let q1 = q2 = b1 = b2 = x > 0, σ
2
1 = σ
2
2 and µ1 = 0.
a) It holds that
∂
∂µ2
d(Q2×2)

< 0, if µ2 < 0,
= 0, if µ2 = 0,
> 0, if µ2 > 0.
b) If v2 > v1 > 0, then
∂Q2×211
∂µ2

> 0, if µ2 < 0,
= 0, if µ2 = 0,
< 0, if µ2 > 0.
5.1.3 The Influence of Systemic Significance on f-Efficient Holdings
We analyze how heterogeneity in systemic significances impacts the degree of diversification of
banks’ holdings. Figure 3 highlights that, as the two banks become closer in terms of systemic
significance, the distance of f-efficient holdings from diversification increases. This highlights the
fundamental role of systemic significance on banks’ f-efficient holdings: if two banks are similar
in terms of systemic significance (for instance because they adopt similar trading strategies), then
it is beneficial to sacrifice diversification benefits to reduce portfolio overlapping, and thus price
pressures. These intuitions can be formalized via the following lemma.
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Figure 3: F-efficient holdings of bank 1 Q2×2k,1 for assets k = 1, 2 and distance from diversification
d(Q2×2) = ‖Q2×2 −Qdiversified‖F as a function of systemic sensitivity v2 for fixed σ
2 = (0.1, 0.2)⊤ ,
µ = (0, 0)⊤, v1 = 0.04, q = b = (0.08, 0.08)
⊤ .
Lemma 5.3. Let q1 = q2 = b1 = b2 = x > 0, v1 > 0 and |z1| 6= |z2|
10. For 0 < v2 6= v1, it holds
that
∂
∂v2
d(Q2×2)

> 0, if v2 < v1,
< 0, if v2 > v1.
5.2 The Case N = K = 3
Having established the results for a system consisting of two banks and two assets, we analyze
numerically how the findings would change for a larger economy. If the number of banks is N > 2,
f-efficient holdings are no longer unique (see Theorem 4.2 b). We then consider the f-efficient
holdings whose Frobenius distance from diversification is minimal. Figure 4 plots the minimal
distance of f-efficient holdings from diversification for the case N = K = 3. Noticeably, the
qualitative findings remain similar to the setting N = K = 2. The f-efficient holdings get farther
away from a full diversification strategy if heterogeneity in banks’ systemic significance decreases.
The intuition behind the result remains unchanged, i.e., in a system where banks are systemically
10A sufficient condition for |z1| 6= |z2| is that µ1 = µ2 and σ
2
1 6= σ
2
2 .
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Figure 4: Isosurface plot of the Frobenius distance d(Qmin) from diversification for the f-efficient
holding matrix Qmin with the smallest distance to diversification. We vary the systemic significance
parameters v1, v2 and v3, and keep fixed shock characteristics, i.e., µ = (0.1, 0.125, 0.15)
⊤ and
σ2 = (0.1, 0.15625, 0.225)⊤ . To ensure comparability with the results of Section 5.1, we choose
qk = bi = 0.08, i, k = 1, 2, 3, and normalize the total supply of each asset to 1.
very close, a full diversification strategy for each bank may lead to larger price pressures because
all banks rebalance their portfolios in a similar fashion to meet their leverage targets.
In Appendix B, we analyze the f-efficient holdings in an economy with more than two banks.
We find that any f-efficient allocation prescribes the most systemically significant bank to have
higher holdings of the less risky asset, and the least systemically significant bank to have higher
holdings of the more risky asset. We also show that for a system of three banks, given a fixed
f-efficient allocation, any other f-efficient allocation is obtained by shifting the holdings within each
bank based on the difference in systemic significances of the other two banks.
5.3 Systemic Significance, Market Scenarios and Asset Holdings
In this section, we analyze how the distribution of banks’ holdings depends on banks’ systemic
significance, heterogeneity in the distributions of initial shocks and illiquidity characteristics of the
assets. We also validate the accuracy of the first order approximation of market capitalization used
throughout the paper. Our results indicate that the mean squared deviation of the actual market
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capitalization from its fundamental value is low if the matrix of bank holdings coincides with the
f-efficient holdings. This indicates that the solution to the (approximate) optimization problem,
i.e., where the first-order approximation of the systemicness matrix is used, yields a low value for
the actual objective function where the exact expression of the systemicness matrix is used.
In the analysis below, we consider three asset classes, each consisting of assets with identical
characteristics, for a total of ten assets. As a result, we demonstrate that the methodology proposed
in this paper scales well to economies larger than those considered (analytically) in earlier sections.
5.3.1 Market Setting
We consider a financial market consisting of N = 2 banks. We choose K = 10 assets, normalize
the total supply of each asset to 1, and set the holdings of banks in each asset to 0.08.11 The two
banks are assumed to have the same budget (b1 = b2 = 0.8), and the vector of leverage targets is
κ = (9, 10)⊤.
Banks are assumed to follow a proportional liquidation strategy, i.e., αki = 1/10 for all assets
k = 1, . . . , 10, and both banks i = 1, 2. The assets belong to three different groups: Assets 1 and 2
belong to group 1, assets 3 through 8 to group 2, and assets 9 and 10 to group 3. Within each of
the three asset groups, the illiquidity characteristics of the assets, and the expectation and variance
of asset price shocks are equal.
We consider three economic scenarios, each characterized by a certain value of the shock variance
and liquidity of the assets. We refer to the three scenarios as liquidity, intermediate crisis, and high
risk high illiquidity scenarios. Across all scenarios, we set µ = (0.1, 0.1, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.3, 0.3)⊤ .
The numerical values of the asset illiquidity characteristics should be thought as normalized to
the corresponding characteristics of a reference asset, and are broadly consistent with the estimates
reported in Table 4 of Duarte and Eisenbach (2019).12 Consistent with empirical evidence, the
higher the illiquidity of the asset (i.e., the lower γ), the larger the variance of the exogenous asset
price shocks, capturing the fact that more illiquid securities have a higher volatility than liquid
ones.
11All parameters in this section are consistent with Capponi and Larsson (2015).
12Their estimates are based on the Net Stable Funding Ratio of the Basel III regulatory framework. Their illiquidity
parameter is the reciprocal of ours, i.e., in their setting a larger value corresponds to a higher illiquidity of the asset.
They take US Treasuries as the reference asset, i.e., the price impact of U.S. Treasuries is normalized to 1.
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(L) Liquidity Scenario:
Banks invest in liquid assets, i.e, assets with high price elasticities, or equivalently, low illiq-
uidity characteristics. The first asset class has the highest price elasticity and the lowest shock
variance, and the third asset class has the lowest price elasticity and the highest variance.
The second asset class has an intermediate value for those two quantities. Specifically, we
choose
γL = (9, 9, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 7, 7)⊤ , σL = (0.1, 0.1, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.3, 0.3)⊤ .
(I) Intermediate Crisis Scenario: In contrast to scenario (L), the third asset class is signifi-
cantly more illiquid (i.e., lower price elasticity) and has higher shock variance. This situation
is typical of the beginning of a crisis period, where one asset may experience a severe shock
and then become hard to sell quickly due to the lack of outside investors (the nonbanking
sector in our model) willing to purchase the asset.13 The parameters corresponding to the
other asset classes are not altered. This scenario is specified by
γL = (9, 9, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 1, 1)⊤ , σL = (0.1, 0.1, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 1, 1)⊤ .
(H) High Risk High Illiquidity Scenario: Banks invest in assets with high illiquidity and
volatility. This captures, for instance, a situation where banks invest in securities such as
non-agency based mortgage, municipal bonds, or commercial and industry loans. All asset
classes are thus characterized by a lower price elasticity and higher shock variance compared
to the previous two scenarios:
γH = (3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1)⊤ , σH = (0.9, 0.9, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1, 1.2, 1.2)⊤ .
Next, we compute the f-efficient holdings and banks’ systemic significances for each of the above
defined scenarios.
• In the liquidity scenario (L), the systemic significance of the banks equal vL1 ≈ 1.23 < 1.37 ≈
13For instance, the volume of agency mortgage backed securities, typically highly liquid assets, declined substantially
from 2008 to 2014, which is an indicator of worsening liquidity.
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vL2 . The second bank—tracking a higher leverage ratio—is systemically more significant than
the first bank. f-efficient holdings are given by
Q∗,L ≈
−3.79 −3.79 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 1.37 1.37
3.87 3.87 −0.79 −0.79 −0.79 −0.79 −0.79 −0.79 −1.29 −1.29

⊤
.
The systemically more significant bank 2 is endowed with a higher number of assets of class 1
(high elasticity, low variance); the least significant bank 1 holds a larger portion of the other
assets (smaller elasticity, higher variance).
• In scenario (I), bank 2 is still systemically more significant than bank 1, i.e., vI1 ≈ 2.91 <
3.23 ≈ vI2 ; in comparison to scenario (B), both banks’ systemic significances increase due to
the increased illiquidity and shock variances of assets from group 3. The f-efficient holdings
are given by:
Q∗,I ≈
−3.87 −3.87 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 0.87 0.87
3.95 3.95 −0.99 −0.99 −0.99 −0.99 −0.99 −0.99 −0.79 −0.79

⊤
.
Again, the higher the systemic significance of the bank, the lower its holdings of the safer
asset relative to the riskier asset.
• In scenario (H), bank 2 remains systemically more significant than bank 1, with vH1 ≈ 5.54 <
6.16 ≈ vH2 , and the significance parameters are higher than in the two other scenarios. The
f-efficient holdings are:
Q∗,H ≈
−0.41 −0.41 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.31 0.31
0.49 0.49 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.23 −0.23

⊤
.
In this scenario, there is little heterogeneity in the riskiness of the assets, and high hetero-
geneity in banks’ systemic significance. As a result, the f-efficient holdings are more evenly
distributed, i.e., closer to full diversification (see also the values of the distances given in Table
1 below).
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5.3.2 Diversification and f-Efficiency
In this section, we compute the exact market capitalization, i.e.,
MCe = Q⊤tot(P0 + (I − S)
−1Z),
both under f-efficient (Q∗,·) and fully diversified (Qdiversified) holding matrices. We suppose that
the vector of shocks Z follows a multivariate normal distribution with mean vector µ, which is
the same across all scenarios, and covariance matrix Diag(σ2), where σ depends on the considered
scenario. In each scenario, we draw 100, 000 independent samples of the shock vector Z.
We report the relevant statistics in Table 1. Figure 5 also provides a comparison of the prob-
ability density functions of market inefficiency and the corresponding box plots across all three
scenarios. Consistent with intuition, the variance of market capitalization is the smallest in the
liquidity scenario, and the highest in the high risk high illiquidity scenario. We find that diversifica-
tion results in a higher variance than f-efficiency across all market scenarios. While this difference is
not very significant in the liquidity scenario, it becomes considerable in the high illiquidity high risk
scenario, especially if (as in the intermediate crisis scenario) the assets are shocked heterogeneously.
Observe, from the first row of the table, that the distance between f-efficient and fully diversi-
fied holding matrices is the lowest in the scenario (H). Nevertheless, the mean-squared deviation
criterion and variance of the exact market capitalization is the highest (in absolute terms) in such
a scenario. Taken together, these two observations imply that if banks invest in high risk high illiq-
uid assets, it suffices to only slightly distort the holdings from f-efficiency to induce large increases
in the variance and mean squared deviation of market capitalization from its fundamental value.
This is because holdings that are not f-efficient, such as fully diversified holdings, create a price
pressure which becomes increasingly larger as we move towards balance sheets with highly volatile
and illiquid assets.
6 Conclusion
We developed a model to examine the ex-ante asset holdings which minimize market efficiency in
a systemic multi-asset economy. Price pressure arises in our model from the exogenous trading
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Figure 5: Probability density function estimates (a) and box plots (b) of market inefficiency
MCe −MCf for f-efficient (Q∗,·) and fully diversified (Qdiversified) holdings, generated from 100,000
samples of Z ∼ N10(µ,Diag((σ
·)2)), in the three considered scenarios: (L) liquidity, (I) intermediate
crisis, and (H) high risk high illiquidity.
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L I H I/L H/L
d(Q∗,·) 8.61 8.74 1.08 1.02 0.13
E(MCe) for Q∗,· 12.07 12.20 13.45 1.01 1.11
E(MCe) for Qdiversified 12.23 12.65 13.74 1.03 1.12
Var(MCe) for Q∗,· 0.44 2.23 37.20 5.07 84.55
Var(MCe) for Qdiversified 0.55 3.95 41.39 7.18 75.25
E[(MCe −MCf )2] for Q∗,· 0.02 0.10 9.66 5.00 483.00
E[(MCe −MCf )2] for Qdiversified 0.06 0.66 12.14 11.00 202.33
Table 1: Statistics from the Monte-Carlo simulation used to estimate the exact market capital-
ization. The Frobenius distance d(Q∗,·) measures the difference between diversified and f-efficient
holdings. The last two columns present the numbers relative to the liquidity scenario.
actions of banks which manage their portfolios to target specific leverage ratios. In the model,
we quantify efficiency in terms of the mean squared deviation of market capitalization from cap-
italization measured using fundamental values. We find that inefficiencies are low if banks are
not systemically significant, but become substantial if the overall systemic significance is high and
banks are not sufficiently heterogeneous in systemic significance. We develop a procedure which
constructs f-efficient holdings, and show that these depend on two key sufficient statistics, namely
the banks’ systemic significance and the first two moments of exogenous asset shocks. Our anal-
ysis reveals that increasing heterogeneity in banks’ systemic significance moves f-efficient holdings
closer to full diversification, while heterogeneity in the distribution (expectation and variance) of
exogenous asset value shocks moves f-efficient holdings away from diversification. In balance sheet
scenarios characterized by high risk and illiquidity, deviating from f-efficient holdings would result
in high inefficiencies and large variance of market capitalization.
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Appendix A Proofs
A.1 Proofs of Section 2
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
This proof is obtained by specializing Proposition 1.1 in Capponi and Larsson (2015) to a setting
with only one period, and assuming zero revenue shocks therein, i.e., ∆Ri = 0. The fundamental
cash-flow equation is given by:
P k1∆Q
ki = αki∆Di, k = 1, . . . ,K, (A.1)
Writing the cash-flow equation (A.1) in vector form yields
Diag(P1)∆Q
i = αi∆Di.
Substituting for Dit in the above equation the expressions for L
i, we obtain
Diag(P1)∆Q
i = αi
(
Li11
⊤Ai1 − L
i
01
⊤Ai0
)
= αi
(
Li11
⊤(Ai1 −A
i
0) + (L
i
1 − L
i
0)1
⊤Ai0
)
(A.2)
Rearranging the above expression leads to
(
Diag(P1)− L
iαiP⊤1
)
∆Qi = αiLiQi⊤0 ∆P. (A.3)
The matrix multiplied by ∆Qi can be inverted using the Sherman-Morrison formula. First, since
1⊤αi = 1, we have
1− LiP⊤1 Diag(P1)
−1αi = 1− Li1⊤αi = 1− Li 6= 0,
so invertibility is guaranteed. The inverse is given by
Diag(P1)
−1 + κiDiag(P1)
−1αiP⊤1 Diag(P1)
−1,
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which simplifies to Diag(P1)
−1(I + κiαi1⊤). From (A.3) we therefore obtain
Diag(P1)∆Q
i = (I + κiαi1⊤)
(
αiLiQi⊤0 ∆P
)
= (1 + κi)αi
(
LiQi⊤0 ∆P
)
,
where the second equality uses the identity (I+κiαi1⊤)αi = (1+κi)αi, which follows from 1⊤αi = 1.
Noting that (1 + κi)Li = κi, we obtain
Diag(P1)∆Q
i = κiαiQi⊤0 ∆P,
and the stated expression (2.2) follows.
A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
This proof is obtained by specializing Proposition 2.1 in Capponi and Larsson (2015) to a setting
with only one period, and assuming zero revenue shocks therein, i.e., ∆Ri = 0. First, we use the
market-clearing condition (2.5), and then the expressions (2.2) and (2.3) for the demand functions
to get
0 = P1 ◦∆Q
nb +
N∑
i=1
P1 ◦∆Q
i
= Diag(γ ◦Qnb0 ) (Z −∆P ) +
N∑
i=1
αiκiQi⊤0 ∆P.
Multiplying from the left by Diag(γ ◦Qnb0 )
−1 and rearranging yields
[
I −
N∑
i=1
αi
γ ◦Qnb0
κiQi⊤0
]
∆P = Z. (A.4)
The left-hand side is thus equal to (I −S)∆P . We now simply multiply both sides of the equality
(A.4) from the left by (I − S)−1 to arrive at the stated price change (2.7).
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A.2 Proof of Section 4
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
• We first prove the direction (i)⇒(ii): LetQ∗ ∈ argmin
Q∈D
(Qv)⊤G(Qv) be an f-efficient holding
matrix. Since the objective function does only depend on the vector Qv ∈ RK , the following
statements are equivalent:
Q∗ ∈ argmin
Q∈D
(Qv)⊤G(Qv) ⇔ y˜ := Q∗v ∈ argmin
y∈D˜
y⊤Gy, (A.5)
where D˜ := {y ∈ RK | ∃ Q ∈ D s.t. y = Qv}. Since every vector of the form y = Qv for one
Q ∈ D satisfies
1⊤Ky = 1
⊤
KQv = b
⊤v,
it obviously holds that D˜ ⊆ Dy = {y ∈ R
K | 1⊤Ky = b
⊤v} yielding min
y∈D˜
y⊤Gy ≥ min
y∈Dy
y⊤Gy.
However, as shown by Proposition 4.2, if y∗ ∈ Dy solves the aggregate problem, i.e., y
∗ ∈
argmin
y∈Dy
y⊤Gy, then there exists a matrix Q˜ such that y∗ = Q˜v, i.e., y∗ ∈ D˜ . Hence,
y˜⊤Qy˜ = min
y∈D˜
y⊤Gy = min
y∈Dy
y⊤Gy = (y∗)⊤Gy∗,
i.e. y˜ = Q∗v solves the aggregate problem (4.3).
• Second, we prove the direction (ii)⇒ (i): Let y∗ = Q∗v ∈ argmin
y∈Dy
y⊤Gy solve the aggregate
problem. Since min
y∈D˜
y⊤Gy ≥ min
y∈Dy
y⊤Gy, with D˜ as defined in the previous step, and
since y∗ = Q∗v for some Q∗ ∈ D , we have that y∗ = Q∗v ∈ argmin
y∈D˜
y⊤Gy, which, finally, is
equivalent to Q∗ being f-efficient, see (A.5).
A.2.2 Proof of Lemma 4.1
The KKT conditions for minimizing y⊤Gy subject to y ∈ Dy read as
G 1K
1⊤K 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:M
·
y
λ
 =
0K
b⊤v
 . (A.6)
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The inverse of the KKT matrixM is by blockwise inversion (see, e.g., Proposition 2.8.7 in Bernstein
(2005)) given by
M−1 =
G−1 −G−11K(1⊤KG−11K)−11⊤KG−1 G−11K(1⊤KG−11K)−1
(1⊤KG
−11K)
−11⊤KG
−1 −(1⊤KG
−11K)
−1
 =:
A B
C D
 ,
with A ∈ RK×K, B ∈ RK×1, C ∈ R1×K and D ∈ R. Note that this inverse matrix exists because,
firstly, G is invertible because it is symmetric and positive definite, with inverse given by the
Sherman-Morrison formula
G−1 = Diag( 1
σ2
)−
µ
σ2
( µ
σ2
)⊤
1 + ( µσ2 )
⊤µ
,
and, secondly,
1⊤KG
−11K = (
1
σ2
)⊤1K −
(1⊤K
µ
σ2 )
2
1 + ( µ
σ2
)⊤µ
6= 0,
since with c := ( 1
σ2
)⊤1K > 0
( 1
σ2
)⊤1K −
(1⊤K
µ
σ2
)2
1 + ( µσ2 )
⊤µ
= 0 ⇔ c(1 + ( µ
σ2
)⊤µ)− (1⊤K
µ
σ2
)2 = 0
⇔ c+ c · (µσ )
⊤(µσ )− (
µ
σ )
⊤ 1
σ (
1
σ )
⊤ µ
σ = 0
⇔ (µσ )
⊤(I − 1c ·
1
σ (
1
σ )
⊤︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:E
)µσ = −1,
and this cannot be fulfilled for any µσ ∈ R
K since E ∈ RK×K is a positive semidefinite matrix due
to its only eigenvalues 0 and 1 (cf. Dattorro (2005), Appendix B.3).
Hence, the f-efficient solution to problem (4.3) is derived from multiplying both sides of equation
(A.6) byM−1 yielding
y∗ = A · 0K +B · (b
⊤v) = b⊤v ·G−11K(1
⊤
KG
−11K)
−1 =
b⊤v
1⊤Kz
z,
where z := G−11K .
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A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 4.2
We define the matrix
Qp :=
(
1
v2−v1
[v2q − y
∗ − (
N∑
i=3
(v2 − vi)bi)e
K
1 ],
1
v2−v1
[y∗ − v1q − (
N∑
i=3
(vi − v1)bi)e
K
1 ], b3e
K
1 , . . . , bNe
K
1
)
∈ RK×N ,
(A.7)
where eK1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0)
⊤ ∈ RK . Without loss of generality, we have assumed here that v2 6= v1
(cf. Assumption 3). This matrix satisfies Qp ∈ D as well as y∗ = Qpv, for y∗ = b
⊤v
1
⊤
K
z
z, the solution
of the aggregate problem (4.3) derived in Lemma 4.1:
• y∗ = Qpv: It holds:
(Qpv)1 =
1
v2 − v1
(
v1v2q1 − y
∗
1v1 − v1
N∑
i=3
(v2 − vi)bi + y
∗
1v2 − v1v2q1 − v2
N∑
i=3
(vi − v1)bi
)
+
N∑
i=3
bivi =
1
v2 − v1
(
(v2 − v1)y
∗
1 − (v2 − v1)
N∑
i=3
bivi
)
+
N∑
i=3
bivi = y
∗
1,
and for k = 2, . . . ,K:
(Qpv)k =
1
v2 − v1
(v1v2qk − y
∗
kv1 + y
∗
kv2 − v1v2qk) = y
∗
k.
• Qp1N = q: We obtain
(Qp1K)1 =
1
v2 − v1
(
v2q1 − y
∗
1 −
N∑
i=3
(v2 − vi)bi + y
∗
1 − v1q1 −
N∑
i=3
(vi − v1)bi
)
+
N∑
i=3
bi
=
1
v2 − v1
(
(v2 − v1)q1 + (v2 − v1)
N∑
i=3
bi
)
+
N∑
i=3
bi = q1,
and for k = 2, . . . ,K:
(Qp1N )k =
1
v2 − v1
(v2qk − y
∗
k + y
∗
k − v1qk) = qk.
• 1⊤KQ
p = b⊤: Obviously, it is (1⊤KQ
p)i = bi, for i = 3, . . . , N . For the first and second entry,
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it holds that
(1⊤KQ
p)1 =
1
v2 − v1
(
v21
⊤
Kq − 1
⊤
Ky
∗ −
N∑
i=3
(v2 − vi)bi
)
=
1
v2 − v1
(
v2
N∑
i=1
bi −
N∑
i=1
bivi −
N∑
i=3
v2bi +
N∑
i=3
bivi
)
=
1
v2 − v1
(v2(b1 + b2)− (v1b1 + v2b2)) = b1,
where in the first step, we have used that
∑K
k=1 qk = T =
∑N
i=1 bi and that 1
⊤
Ky
∗ = b⊤v.
Using the same arguments, we obtain
(1⊤KQ
p)2 =
1
v2 − v1
(
1⊤Ky
∗ − v11
⊤
Kq −
N∑
i=3
(vi − v1)bi
)
=
1
v2 − v1
(
N∑
i=1
bi − v1
N∑
i=1
bivi −
N∑
i=3
bivi +
N∑
i=3
v1bi
)
=
1
v2 − v1
(b1v1 + b2v2 − (v1b1 + v1b2)) = b2,
which completes the proof.
Remark A.1. Due to our two-step solution method proven in Proposition 4.1, finding an f-efficient
holding matrix Q∗ ∈ RK×N is equivalent to solving the linear system

1⊤K 0 · · · 0
0 1⊤K
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . 0
0 · · · 0 1⊤K
IK IK · · · IK
v1IK v2IK · · · vNIK

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:F∈R2K+N×KN
vec(Q∗) =

b
q
y∗
 , (A.8)
where vec(Q∗) ∈ RKN denotes the vectorized version of the matrix Q∗, obtained by stacking its
columns on top of one another. The null space corresponding to the matrix F is spanned by the
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(K − 1)(N − 2) column vectors of the matrix (w.l.o.g. v1 6= v2, cf. Assumption 3)
O :=

v2−v3
v2−v1
(
−1⊤
K−1
IK−1
)
v2−v4
v2−v1
(
−1⊤
K−1
IK−1
)
· · · v2−vNv2−v1
(
−1⊤
K−1
IK−1
)
v3−v1
v2−v1
(
−1⊤K−1
IK−1
)
v4−v1
v2−v1
(
−1⊤K−1
IK−1
)
· · · vN−v1v2−v1
(
−1⊤K−1
IK−1
)
(
1
⊤
K−1
−IK−1
)
0K×K−1 · · · 0K×K−1
0K×K−1
(
1
⊤
K−1
−IK−1
) . . . ...
...
. . .
. . . 0K×K−1
0K×K−1 · · · 0K×K−1
(
1
⊤
K−1
−IK−1
)

∈ RKN×(K−1)(N−2). (A.9)
The fact that the linearly independent column vectors of O lie in the null space of F is easily checked
via direct calculation; the fact that the dimension of the null space is equal to (K−1)(N−2) follows
from a rank-nullity argument given in the proof of Theorem 4.2 b) below. Hence, we are able to
fully characterize the set of f-efficient holding matrices as
Q∗ ∈ RK×N | vec(Q∗) = vec(Qp) +
(K−1)(N−2)∑
j=1
λjCj(O), λ1, . . . , λ(K−1)(N−2) ∈ R
 ,
with particular solution Qp as defined in (A.7) and where Cj(O), for j = 1, . . . , (K − 1)(N − 2),
denotes the j-th column vector of the null space matrix O.
A.2.4 Proof of Theorem 4.2
a) The existence of an f-efficient holding matrix for every N,K ≥ 2 directly follows from Propo-
sitions 4.2 and 4.1. Let y∗ = b
⊤v
1
⊤
K
z
z, the solution of the aggregate problem (4.3) derived in
Lemma 4.1 with z = G−11K . The mean squared deviation under an f-efficient holding matrix
Q∗ is given by:
MSD(Q∗) = (Q∗v)⊤G(Q∗v) = (y∗)⊤Gy∗
=
(b⊤v)2
(1⊤Kz)
2
z⊤Gz =
(b⊤v)2
(1⊤Kz)
2
z⊤GG−11K
=
(b⊤v)2
(1⊤Kz)
2
(z⊤1K) =
(b⊤v)2
1⊤Kz
=
(b⊤v)2
1⊤KG
−11K
.
b) As outlined above in Remark A.1, finding an f-efficient holding matrix Q∗ ∈ RK×N is equiva-
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lent to solving the linear system (A.8). We have the following result: The rank of the matrix
F is equal to 2K + N − 2. This can be proven via standard Gaussian elimination. First,
resorting the rows of F and adding the new first K rows multiplied by −v1 to the second K
rows yields

IK IK · · · IK
v1IK v2IK · · · vNIK
1⊤K 0 · · · 0
0 1⊤K
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . 0
0 · · · 0 1⊤K

→

IK IK · · · IK
0K×K (v2 − v1)IK · · · (vN − v1)IK
1⊤K 0 · · · 0
0 1⊤K
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . 0
0 · · · 0 1⊤K

.
Numbering the rows in this last matrix as r1, . . . , r2K+N , we observe:
r2K+1 =
K∑
i=1
ri −
2K+N∑
i=2K+2
ri
and
r2K+2 =
1
v2 − v1
(
2K∑
i=K+1
ri −
2K+N∑
i=2K+3
(vi−2K − v1)ri
)
,
where, as above, w.l.o.g. v2 6= v1 (cf. Assumption 3). Hence, these two rows can be eliminated
from the matrix yielding the row-echelon form:

IK IK IK IK · · · IK
0K×K (v2 − v1)IK (v3 − v1)IK (v4 − v1)IK · · · (vN − v1)IK
0⊤K 0
⊤
K · · · 0
⊤
K
0⊤K 0
⊤
K · · · 0
⊤
K
0⊤K 0
⊤
K 1
⊤
K 0 · · · 0
0 · · · 0 1⊤K
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
. . . 0
0 · · · 0 · · · 0 1⊤K

,
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which shows that the matrix F possesses the rank 2K + N − 2. The rank-nullity theorem
now gives rise to the dimension of the null space (a basis is given by the column vectors of
the matrix O in Remark A.1 above):
KN = rank(F ) + null(F ) ⇒ null(F ) = KN − (2K +N − 2) = (N − 2)(K − 1).
and, hence, the dimension of the null space is zero, i.e., the solution Qp stated in the proof of
Proposition 4.2 is unique, if and only if either K = 1 or N = 2; i.e., if we additionally assume
that K ≥ 2, then this is equivalent to N = 2. Finally, the formula for QN=2 directly follows
from the definition of Qp in (A.7).
A.2.5 Proof of Theorem 4.3
Recall that Qdiversified = 1T qb
⊤ = 1
1
⊤
K
q
qb⊤. Thus, it holds that
y∗ = Qdiversifiedv
⇔
b⊤v
1⊤Kz
· z =
1
1⊤Kq
q(b⊤v)
b⊤v 6=0
⇔
1
1⊤Kz
z =
1
1⊤Kq
q,
i.e., if and only if q and z = G−11K are linearly dependent.
A.2.6 Proof of Corollary 4.1
• For the proof of statements a) and c), we first observe that if q1 = . . . = qK , then
1
1⊤Kz
z =
1
1⊤Kq
q ⇔
1
1⊤Kz
z =
1
q1 ·K
q1 · 1K
⇔ z =
1
K
· 1K1
⊤
Kz ⇔ K · z = (1K1
⊤
K)z,
i.e., that z is an eigenvector to the eigenvalue K of the all-one matrix 1K×K = 1K1
⊤
K . This
eigenvector is given as z = c · 1K for a constant c ∈ R. Hence, zk = zℓ for all k, ℓ = 1, . . . ,K
is equivalent to Qdiversified being f-efficient under the assumption that q1 = . . . = qK .
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To prove part a), we now set σ21 = . . . = σ
2
K . According to the proof of Lemma 4.1, the vector
z is in this situation given by
z = G−11K =
1
σ21
· 1K −
( 1
σ2
1
)2 · µ⊤1K
1 + 1
σ2
1
·µ⊤µ
· µ.
This means that the condition zk = zℓ for all k, ℓ = 1, . . . ,K is equivalent to
zk =
1
σ21
−
( 1
σ2
1
)2 ·
∑K
j=1 µj
1 + 1
σ2
1
·
∑K
j=1 µ
2
j
· µk
!
=
1
σ21
−
( 1
σ2
1
)2 ·
∑K
j=1 µj
1 + 1
σ2
1
·
∑K
j=1 µ
2
j
· µℓ = zℓ
⇔
( 1
σ2
1
)2 ·
∑K
j=1 µj
1 + 1
σ2
1
·
∑K
j=1 µ
2
j
· µk =
( 1
σ2
1
)2 ·
∑K
j=1 µj
1 + 1
σ2
1
·
∑K
j=1 µ
2
j
· µℓ
⇔ (
∑K
j=1
µj) · µk = (
∑K
j=1
µj) · µℓ,
for all k, ℓ = 1, . . . ,K, i.e., µk = µℓ or
∑K
j=1 µj = 0. Hence, if µ1 = . . . = µK−1, and
µK = µ1 + ε, then, finally, Q
diversified being f-efficient is equivalent to either ε = 0, yielding
µk = µℓ for all k, ℓ = 1, . . . ,K, or ε = −Kµ1, yielding
∑K
j=1 µj = 0.
To prove part c), we set µ1 = . . . = µK , which (see the proof of Lemma 4.1) leads to the
vector z given as:
z = G−11K =
1
σ2
−
µ21 · (
1
σ2
)⊤1K
1 + µ21 · (
1
σ2
)⊤1K
·
1
σ2
.
Thus, the condition zk = zℓ for all k, ℓ = 1, . . . ,K reads as
zk =
1− µ21 ·
∑K
j=1
1
σ2j
1 + µ21 ·
∑K
j=1
1
σ2j
 1
σ2k
!
=
1− µ21 ·
∑K
j=1
1
σ2j
1 + µ21 ·
∑K
j=1
1
σ2j
 1
σ2ℓ
= zℓ
⇔ σ2k = σ
2
ℓ
for all k, ℓ = 1, . . . ,K. Hence, if σ1 = . . . = σK−1 and σK = σ1 + ε, this condition is fulfilled
if and only if ε = 0.
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• For the remaining proof of part b), observe that if µ1 = . . . = µK and σ
2
1 = . . . = σ
2
K , then
z = G−11K =
1
σ21
· 1K −
(µ1
σ2
1
)2 ·K
1 +
µ2
1
σ2
1
K
· 1K ,
in particular: z1 = . . . = zK . Hence:
1
1⊤Kz
z =
1
1⊤Kq
q ⇔
1
z1 ·K
z1 · 1K =
1
1⊤Kq
q
⇔ 1K1
⊤
Kq = K · q
which is equivalent to q being an eigenvector to the eigenvalue K of the all-one matrix
1K×K = 1K1
⊤
K , i.e., q1 = . . . = qK . Hence, if q1 = . . . = qK−1 and qK = q1+ ε, this condition
is equivalent to ε = 0, which completes the proof.
A.3 Proofs of Section 5
A.3.1 Proof of Lemma 5.1
First, we derive the explicit formulas for Q2×211 and d(Q
2×2) in the special case N = K = 2,
q1 = q2 = b1 = b2 = x. Note that, here, the unique f-efficient holding matrix is given by
Q2×2 =
1
v2 − v1
v2q1 − y∗1 y∗1 − v1q1
v2q2 − y
∗
2 y
∗
2 − v1q2
 = x
(v2 − v1)(z1 + z2)
v2z2 − v1z1 v2z1 − v1z2
v2z1 − v1z2 v2z2 − v1z1
 ,
due to y∗ = x · v1+v2z1+z2 · z. Since, Q
diversified = x2 · 12×2, it holds that
Q2×211 −Q
diversified
11 = x ·
2v2z2 − 2v1z1 − (v2 − v1)(z1 + z2)
2(v2 − v1)(z1 + z2)
= x ·
v2z2 − v1z1 − v2z1 + v1z2
2(v2 − v1)(z1 + z2)
= x ·
(z2 − z1)(v1 + v2)
2(v2 − v1)(z1 + z2)
= Q2×222 −Q
diversified
22 ,
and
Q2×212 −Q
diversified
12 = x ·
2v2z1 − 2v1z2 − (v2 − v1)(z1 + z2)
2(v2 − v1)(z1 + z2)
= x ·
v2z1 − v1z2 + v1z1 − v2z2
2(v2 − v1)(z1 + z2)
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= x ·
(z1 − z2)(v1 + v2)
2(v2 − v1)(z1 + z2)
= Q2×221 −Q
diversified
21 .
Hence,
d(Q2×2) = ‖Q2×2 −Qdiversified‖F =
√
4 · x2 ·
(z1 − z2)2(v1 + v2)2
4(v2 − v1)2(z1 + z2)2
= x ·
√
(z1 − z2)2(v1 + v2)2
(v2 − v1)2(z1 + z2)2
.
(A.10)
Moreover, a direct calculation of z = G−11K in the 2-by-2-case shows that
Q2×211 = x ·
v2(µ
2
1 + σ
2
1 − µ1µ2)− v1(µ
2
2 + σ
2
2 − µ1µ2)
(v2 − v1)(µ21 + µ
2
2 − 2µ1µ2 + σ
2
1 + σ
2
2)
, (A.11)
and that
d(Q2×2) = x ·
√
(µ21 − µ
2
2 + σ
2
1 − σ
2
2)
2(v1 + v2)2
(v2 − v1)2(µ21 + µ
2
2 − 2µ1µ2 + σ
2
1 + σ
2
2)
2
. (A.12)
a) Under the conditions q1 = q2 = x and µ1 = µ2, it holds that d(Q
2×2) = 0 as a function of σ1,
if and only if σ21 = σ
2
2 (cf. Corollary 4.1), and it is strictly positive everywhere else. Hence,
we can equivalently analyze the monotonicity behavior of d(Q2×2)2. According to (A.12), its
derivative with respect to σ1 is given by
∂
∂σ1
d(Q2×2)2 =
8σ1σ
2
2(σ
2
1 − σ
2
2)(v1 + v2)
2x2
(σ21 + σ
2
2)
3(v1 − v2)2

< 0, if σ21 < σ
2
2,
= 0, if σ21 = σ
2
2,
> 0, if σ21 > σ
2
2,
for σ1 > 0 under the given assumptions, which proves the statement.
b) Now assume x > 0 and v2 > v1 > 0. The derivative of (A.11) with respect to σ1 is given by
∂Q2×211
∂σ1
= x ·
2σ1(µ
2
2 + σ
2
2 − µ1µ2)(v1 + v2)
(v2 − v1)(µ21 + µ
2
2 − 2µ1µ2 + σ
2
1 + σ
2
2)
2
µ1=µ2
= x ·
2σ1σ
2
2(v1 + v2)
(σ21 + σ
2
2)
2(v2 − v1)
> 0,
for σ1 > 0 under the given assumptions.
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A.3.2 Proof of Lemma 5.2
a) As in the proof of Lemma 5.1, d(Q2×2) as a function of µ2 is non-negative and, under the
given assumptions, strictly positive except for the case µ2 = µ1 (cf. Corollary 4.1). Hence, we
can again equivalently analyze the monotonicity behavior of the squared distance d(Q2×2)2.
Its derivative with respect to µ2 is given by
∂
∂µ2
d(Q2×2)2 = x2 ·
4(µ21 − µ
2
2 + σ
2
1 − σ
2
2)(−2µ2σ
2
1 + µ1(µ
2
1 + µ
2
2 − 2µ1µ2 + σ
2
1 − σ
2
2))(v1 + v2)
2
(µ21 − 2µ1µ2 + µ
2
2 + σ
2
1 + σ
2
2)
3(v2 − v1)2
σ2
1
=σ2
2
,µ1=0
= x2 ·
8µ32σ
2
1(v1 + v2)
2
(µ22 + 2σ
2
1)
3(v2 − v1)2

< 0, if µ2 < 0,
= 0, if µ2 = 0,
> 0, if µ2 > 0,
which proves the lemma.
b) The derivative of (A.11) with respect to µ2 is given by
∂
∂µ2
Q2×211 = x ·
(−2µ2σ
2
1 + µ1(µ
2
1 + µ
2
2 − 2µ1µ2 + σ
2
1 − σ
2
2))(v1 + v2)
(µ21 + µ
2
2 − 2µ1µ2 + σ
2
1 + σ
2
2)
2(v2 − v1)
σ2
1
=σ2
2
,µ1=0
= x ·
−2µ2σ
2
1(v1 + v2)
(µ22 + 2σ
2
1)
2(v2 − v1)

> 0, if µ2 < 0,
= 0, if µ2 = 0,
< 0, if µ2 > 0,
under the assumptions v2 > v1 > 0, x > 0, σ
2
1 = σ
2
2 and µ1 = 0.
A.3.3 Proof of Lemma 5.3
The derivative of (A.10) with respect to v2 is given as
∂
∂v2
d(Q2×2) = x ·
2v1
(v1 + v2)(v1 − v2)
·
√
(v1 + v2)2(z1 − z2)2
(v2 − v1)2(z1 + z2)2
.
Under the given assumptions x, v1 > 0, |z1| 6= |z2|, and v2 6= v1, this term is strictly positive for
v2 > 0, if v2 < v1 and strictly negative if v2 > v1. This is the statement of the lemma.
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Appendix B Non-Uniqueness of Asset Holdings
We provide an example to show how the interplay between systemic significance and asset riski-
ness influences the structure of f-efficient holdings. We also discuss the intuition behind the non-
uniqueness of holdings when we move from an economy with N = 2 banks to one with N > 2
banks. Consider an economy with N = 3 banks and K = 3 assets, where we normalize the total
supply of assets within the banking sector and budgets of banks to q1 = q2 = q3 = b1 = b2 = b3 = x
with x := 0.08. The total supply of each asset is normalized to 1. Asset 1 constitutes the least
and asset 3 the most risky asset: µ = (0, 0, 0)⊤ and σ2 = (0.15, 0.2, 0.3)⊤ . The three banks are
different in their systemic sensitivity parameters v = (0.15, 0.1, 0.05)⊤ , i.e., bank 1 is the most and
bank 3 the least significant to the system. According to Theorem 4.2 b), f-efficient holdings in this
financial system are not unique. Every f-efficient holding matrix is of the form
Q∗1 + λ1

1 −2 1
−1 2 −1
0 0 0
+ λ2

1 −2 1
0 0 0
−1 2 −1
 , λ1, λ2 ∈ R, (B.1)
where
Q∗1 = x ·

2
3
1
3 0
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 13
2
3

is a particular solution: the f-efficient holding matrix with the smallest Frobenius distance to fully
diversified holdings Qdiversified = x · 13 · 13×3. Hence, Q
∗1 represents a lower bound on how far
holdings need to move away from the classical diversification benchmark in order to become f-
efficient. Setting λ1 = x · 1/3 and λ2 = −x · 1/6 in equation (B.1), we obtain a second particular
solution:
Q∗2 = x ·

5
6 0
1
6
0 1 0
1
6 0
5
6
 ,
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which represents those f-efficient holdings with the smallest distance to a fully diverse holding
matrix Qdiverse = x · I3. Note, first, that this type of diverse holdings are only defined in the case
N = K. Second, observe that holdings with the smallest distance to diversity do not maximize the
distance to diversification.14
The example provides the following insights:
• In both Q∗1 and Q∗2, the most risky asset 3 is held in the largest proportion by the least
systemically significant bank 3. Conversely, the least risky asset 1 is held in the largest
proportion by the most significant bank 1.
This can be generalized as follows: For every f-efficient holding matrix (see (B.1)), the holdings
of the most significant bank 1 in the least risky asset 1 (x · 2/3 + λ1+ λ2) are larger than the
holdings of the least significant bank 3 in this asset (λ1+λ2). Conversely, for every f-efficient
matrix, the holdings of the least significant bank 3 in the most risky asset 3 (x · 2/3−λ2) are
larger than bank 1’s holdings in this asset (−λ2).
• Note that the null space in Equation (B.1) is equivalently written as (cf. Remark A.1 in
Appendix A):
λ1

−(v2 − v3) v1 − v3 −(v1 − v2)
v2 − v3 −(v1 − v3) v1 − v2
0 0 0
+ λ2

−(v2 − v3) v1 − v3 −(v1 − v2)
0 0 0
v2 − v3 −(v1 − v3) v1 − v2

for λ1, λ2 ∈ R. Hence, any transfer between two assets in each bank’s holdings that is done
somewhat proportionally to the differences between the systemic significances (of the other
two banks) does not alter the mean-squared deviation. This is the reason for the uniqueness
criterion we found: If there are only two banks in the system, there simply are no “other two
banks”, and thus, there are no transfers which are neutral with respect to the mean-squared
deviation.
14Since λ1, λ2 in formula (B.1) are unbounded, the distance to diversification within the set of f-efficient holdings
is unbounded.
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Appendix C f-Efficient Liquidation Strategies
C.1 General Derivation
We want to minimize the mean squared deviation (3.4) as a function of
α =
(
α1 | · · · | αN
)
∈ RK×N , for αi ∈ RK with 1⊤Kα
i = 1 and αi ≥ 0K for all i = 1, . . . , N.
Thus, each bank i is allowed to choose its own personal liquidation strategy αi and we do not allow
for short-selling. In the following lemma, we rewrite the minimization problem as a function of
vec(α) := (α1⊤, . . . , αN⊤)⊤ ∈ RKN ,
i.e., vec(α) denotes the vectorization of the matrix α.
Lemma C.1. Minimizing the mean squared deviation as a function of the liquidation strategy
matrix α with α ≥ 0 is equivalent to the following problem:
min
vec(α)∈RKN
1
2 vec(α)
⊤(C ⊗ Qtot
γ◦Qnb
0
( Qtot
γ◦Qnb
0
)⊤)vec(α) (G)
s.t.

1⊤K 0
. . .
0 1⊤K
 vec(α) = 1N , vec(α) ≥ 0KN ,
where C = (Cij)i,j=1,...,N ∈ R
N×N with Cij := 2(QDiag(κ)ei)⊤(µµ⊤ + Diag(σ2))(QDiag(κ)ej),
ei ∈ RN denotes the i’th basis vector (i.e., eij = 1 for j = i and zero, otherwise), and ⊗ denotes
the Kronecker product15.
Proof. It holds that QDiag(κ)α⊤ Qtot
γ◦Qnb
0
= QDiag(κ) · (
N∑
i=1
(αi
⊤ Qtot
γ◦Qnb
0
)ei). Inserting this expression
15For two matrices A ∈ RM×N ,B ∈ RP×R, the Kronecker product is defined by multiplying every entry of the
matrix A by the entire matrix B, i.e.,
A⊗B :=


A11B · · · A1NB
...
. . .
...
AM1B · · · AMNB

 ∈ RMP×NR.
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into formula (3.4) yields
MSD(α1, . . . , αN ) =(
(
N∑
i=1
(αi
⊤ Qtot
γ◦Qnb
0
))QDiag(κ)ei
)⊤
(µµ⊤ +Diag(σ2))
( N∑
j=1
(αj
⊤ Qtot
γ◦Qnb
0
))QDiag(κ)ej

=
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(
(αi
⊤ Qtot
γ◦Qnb
0
)QDiag(κ)ei
)⊤
(µµ⊤ +Diag(σ2))
(
(αj
⊤ Qtot
γ◦Qnb
0
)QDiag(κ)ej
)
=
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
αi
⊤ Qtot
γ◦Qnb
0
( Qtot
γ◦Qnb
0
)⊤αj(QDiag(κ)ei)⊤(µµ⊤ +Diag(σ2))(QDiag(κ)ej)
=
1
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
αi
⊤
(Cij · Qtot
γ◦Qnb
0
( Qtot
γ◦Qnb
0
)⊤)αj .
This proves the formula for the objective function. The linear constraint follows from 1⊤Kα
i = 1 for
all i = 1, . . . , N .
The following proposition now provides a locally f-efficient liquidation strategy. Its interpreta-
tion is given in Remark C.1.
Proposition C.1. Let m := maxk∈{1,...,K}
γkQ
k,nb
0
Qktot
denote the maximum entry in the vector
γ◦Qnb
0
Qtot
and denote by
km = {k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} |
γkQ
k,nb
0
Qktot
= m}
the corresponding index set with cardinality #km. For every fixed Q ∈ R
K×N , a local minimizer of
the mean squared deviation as a function of the liquidation strategy matrix is given by the matrix
α∗ which is defined by its columns:
αik
∗
:=

1
|km|
, if k ∈ km,
0, otherwise,
(k = 1, . . . ,K, i = 1, . . . , N).
Proof. It is easily checked that the triplet (vec(α∗), λ∗, s∗), defined as follows, solves the KKT
conditions belonging to the optimization problem (G): vec(α∗) = (α1
∗⊤
, . . . , αN
∗⊤
)⊤ as defined in
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Proposition C.1, λ∗ = (λ∗1, . . . , λ
∗
N ) ∈ R
N and s∗ = (s1
∗
, . . . , sN
∗
) ∈ RKN , where
λ∗i =
∑N
j=1 C
ij
m2
, si
∗
=
∑N
j=1 C
ij
m (
Qtot
γ◦Qnb
0
− 1m1K), for all i = 1, . . . , N.
Next, we need to check f-efficiency. Let gik(α) := −α
ik, and hi(α) :=
∑K
k=1 α
ik − 1 describe the
non-negativity and linear conditions of the optimization problem (G), i.e., the conditions translate
into gik(α) ≤ 0 and hi(α) = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , N and k = 1, . . . ,K. Let d = (d
⊤
1 , . . . , d
⊤
N ) ∈ R
KN ,
where di ∈ R
K for all i = 1, . . . , N and define
F (α) := {d 6= 0 | ∇gik(α)
⊤d

= 0, k /∈ km
≤ 0, k ∈ km,
and ∇hi(α)
⊤d = 0, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}}.
Applying the second order sufficiency conditions (cf. Theorem 5.2 in Freund (2016)), the KKT
point (vec(α∗), λ∗, s∗) constitutes a local minimum if for all d ∈ F (α∗) it holds that d⊤(C ⊗
( Qtot
γ◦Qnb
0
)( Qtot
γ◦Qnb
0
)⊤)d > 0. We have
F (α) = {d 6= 0 | dik

= 0, k /∈ km
≥ 0, k ∈ km,
and
K∑
k=1
dik = 0, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}} = ∅
for all α and, hence, the second order sufficiency condition is always fulfilled. Thus, (vec(α∗), λ∗, s∗)
constitutes a local minimum.
Remark C.1. • Note that we may characterize liquidity of asset k by its product of elasticity
and supply in the nonbanking sector weighted by total supply, i.e., by γk ·Q
k,nb
0 /Q
k
tot. Propo-
sition C.1 thus shows that the f-efficient liquidation strategy of banks is given by selling solely
the most liquid asset. We will refer to this f-efficient strategy as the most-liquid-strategy.
• Note that the most-liquid-strategy depends on (the row sums of) the holding matrix Q since
it holds that Qk,nb0 = 1−
∑N
i=1Q
ki for all assets k = 1, . . . ,K.
• In the special case that we ex ante assume that all banks follow the same liquidation strategy,
the most-liquid-strategy even constitutes a global minimizer of the mean squared deviation.
This example is analyzed in Appendix C.2.
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C.2 Liquidation Strategy Example
In this case study, we ex ante assume that all banks act homogeneously in that they liquidate their
portfolios in the exact same way. This assumption leads to the following structure of the liquidation
strategy matrix:
α = (α˜ | · · · | α˜) ,
for a vector α˜ ∈ RK , with 1⊤α˜ = 1, specifying the banks’ liquidation of each asset. For the mean
squared deviation, this leads to the equation
MSD(α˜,Q) = (α˜⊤ Qtot
γ◦Qnb
0
)2 · (Qκ)⊤(µµ⊤ +Diag(σ2))(Qκ).
For a fixed given holding matrix Q, we define an f-efficient bank-independent liquidation strategy
α˜ as a minimizer of MSD(·,Q) over all α˜ ∈ RK≥0 with 1
⊤α˜ = 1. We have the following result.
Proposition C.2. For every fixed Q ∈ RK×N , the most-liquid-strategy constitutes a globally f-
efficient bank-independent liquidation strategy.
Proof. Minimizing MSD(α˜,Q) for a fixed Q over all α˜ ∈ RK≥0 with 1
⊤α˜ = 1 is equivalent to
min
α˜∈RK
1
2 α˜
⊤ Qtot
γ◦Qnb
0
( Qtot
γ◦Qnb
0
)⊤α˜
s.t. 1⊤α˜ = 1, α˜ ≥ 0. (BI)
The KKT conditions for this optimization problem read
1⊤α˜ = 1, Qtot
γ◦Qnb
0
( Qtot
γ◦Qnb
0
)⊤α˜− λ1− s = 0, α˜ ≥ 0, s ≥ 0, α˜ksk = 0, (k = 1, . . . ,K).
Let m,km and #km be defined as in Proposition C.1. Direct calculation shows that a solution to
the KKT conditions is given by (α˜∗, λ∗, s∗) defined through
α˜∗k :=

1
#km
, if k ∈ km,
0, otherwise.
, (k = 1, . . . ,K), λ∗ := 1m2 , s
∗ := 1m(
Qtot
γ◦Qnb
0
− 1m1).
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(BI) possesses a convex domain, linear constraints and a convex objective function, because Qtot
γ◦Qnb
0
( Qtot
γ◦Qnb
0
)⊤
is positive semidefinite. Hence, α˜∗ constitutes a global minimizer of (BI).
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